Abstract-This paper proposes a d istri buted f ramework for demand response and user adaptation in smart grid networks. In particular, we borrow the concept of congestion pricing in Internet traffic control and show that pricing information is very useful to regulate user demand and hence balance network load. User preference is modeled as a willingness to pay parameter which can be seen as an indicator of differential quality of service. Both analysis and s i mulation results are presented to demonstrate the dynamics and convergence behavior of the algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart grid is an intelligent electricity network that inte grates the actions of all users connected to it and makes use of advanced information, control, and communication technolo gies to save energy, reduce cost and increase reliability and transparency. In electricity grids, demand response (DR) is a mechanism for achieving energy efficiency through managing customer consumption of electricity in response to supply conditions, e.g., having end users reduce their demand at critical times or in response to market prices. In the future smart grid, the two way communications between energy provider and end users enabled by advanced communication infrastructure (e.g., wireless sensor networks and power line communications) and protocols will greatly enhance demand response capabilities of the whole system. In contrast to the current simple time-of-use (TOU) pricing (e.g. peak time vs. off-peak time), it can be envisaged that a more dynamic, real-time adaptation to market prices would not only enable consumers to save more energy and money, as well as man age their usage preferences more flexibly, but also facilitate the grid move closer towards its optimal operating point. For a recent overview of challenges and issues of enabling communication technologies in this area, please refer to [1] . It has been shown in [2] that demand response can deliver significant benefits for consumers, utilities, and society at large. According to the experiments in [2] , there exist huge DR opportunities in residential homes where the operation of many home appliances (e.g., dishwashers, dryers) can be shifted to off-peak times. Moving one million smart appliances from on peak to off peak will save billions of dollars in coal power plant construction cost. Further, with the wide adoption of PHEVs (plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) in the future, there is a clear need for more active and enhanced demand response mechanisms such as that proposed in [3] .
There are a few papers recently on smart grid DR using load scheduling. In [4] , user preferences are taken into account with the concept of discomfort level and an optimization problem is formulated to balance the load and minimize the user in convenience caused by demand scheduling. Several ideas from the distributed computing area such as makespan have been introduced to energy consumption optimization. Similarly, in [5] , an energy consumption scheduling problem is established to minimize the overall energy cost. Techniques similar to those used in wireless network resource allocation have been applied here to solve the underlying optimization problem. In both works, the user demands are known beforehand and the optimization problem is solved in numerical iterations.
In this paper, we consider a fully distributed system where the only information available to the end users is the current price which is dependent on the overall system load. Based on this information, the users try to adapt their demands so as to maximize their own utility. There is no central control entity. Inspired by the well-established work on congestion pricing in IP networks, we propose a simple adaptation strategy based on price feedbacks and show that it is very effective in achieving demand response.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our DR model and the adaptation algorithm. We present some simulation results in Section 3. Conclusions and future work are presented in Section 4.
II. DEMAND RESPONSE MODEL

A. Congestion pricing background
In this paper we propose to apply the principle of congestion pricing in IP networks to demand response in the electricity grid. In their seminal paper [6] , Kelly et al. have proposed the proportionally fair pricing (PFP) scheme in which each user declares a price per unit time that he is willing to pay for his flow. In that sense the network capacity is shared among the flows of all users in proportion to the prices paid by the users. It has been shown in [6] that in a weighted proportionally fair system where the weights are the prices the users pay per unit time, when each user chooses the price that maximizes the utility she gets from the network, the system converges to a state where the total utility of the network is maximized. In other words, in an ideal environment, the PFP proposal is able to decentralize the global optimal allocation of congestible resources. Another important result of [6] is that rate control (such as TCP) based on additive increase and multiplicative decrease achieves proportional fairness. It has also been proved that the decentralized congestion control mechanism is stable even under arbitrary network topologies and heterogeneous round trip times (feedback delays).
In Kelly's approach, the philosophy is that users who are willing to pay more should get more. As the network makes no explicit promises to the user, there is no need for over provisioning in the core of the network. One implementation of PFP is to give control to end systems (users). In this scheme, the TCP algorithm is modified to incorporate congestion prices by means of protocols like explicit congestion notification (ECN) [7] . Upon receiving feedback signals, f (t), which are related to shadow prices (in terms of packet marks), the users are free to react as they choose, but will incur charges when resources are congested. An end system can adjust its rate x(t) using a willingness to pay (WTP) parameter w:
where a affects the rate of convergence of the algorithm.
In [8] , explicit prices instead of marks are fed back to the end users as incentives and users adapt their rates accordingly. It has been shown that the system converges to an optimal allocation of bandwidth: the users' price predictions converge to the actual price. As we will show later, this pricing model fits in nicely with DR in the smart grid.
B. The DR model and user adaptation
Similar to [8] , we consider a discrete time slot system where N users share some energy resources. In each time slot n, user i has a demand of xi(n) (e.g. hourly energy consumption if the time granularity is one hour). The unit price of energy in a time slot is a function of the aggregate demand: 
where a and k are constants, and C is the capacity of the market. It turns out that the price function could be of the same form as that in certain communication networks [8] .
Each user i is associated with a utility function Ui (Xi (n)) in time slot n, which is a concave, non-decreasing function of its demand. A typical logarithmic utility function is given by:
where Wi is the willingness to pay parameter [6] . Hence user i chooses its demand Xi (n) to seek to maximize
We would like to elaborate on a few assumptions made in the above model. Firstly, in our model the demand X is a continuous variable, which may not be realistic in practice. For example, in real life, the daily usages of a washing machine and a dryer are (fixed as) 1.49 kWh and 2.50 kWh respectively.
Here the adaptation of X can be seen as an action of load scheduling: for example, re-scheduling a dryer operation from time slot n = 1 to slot n = 3 leads to x(l) reduced by 2.50 kW per hour and x(3) increased by 2.50 kW per hour.
Secondly, how to characterize user preference is an open issue. For instance, a user may prefer his washing done at 6pm which is a typical peak time. To some extent, this preference can be reflected in the WTP parameter w in (4): when a user is willing to pay more, he/she can have a higher demand. However, the delay (or waiting time) incurred due to rescheduling is not considered in this model. Thirdly, as pointed out in [6] , log arithmic utility functions lead to proportional fairness. There are other types of utility functions available corresponding to different fairness criteria, e.g. Ui(X) = WixfJ(3-l,j3 < 1 as proposed in [8] . How to choose a most suitable utility function in DR applications is an open issue, e.g. how to factor in the waiting time and user discomfort level [4] .
User i adapts its demand according to the following equa tion:
where ai is a parameter that controls the rate of convergence of the algorithm. It is clear that the user adjusts her demand according to the price information (p( n» and her own will ingness to pay preference (w).
To show that the above adaptation converges to the user optimum, let us assume that the equilibrium price is q. Then by solving u�(xi(n)) = q, we have the optimal demand xi as
Given (6), the error of demand estimate, ei(n + 1), is given
Then it follows that W · ei(n + 1) = ( 1 -aiq)(Xi(n) ----.!:. ) = ( 1 -aiq)ei(n). (9) q Therefore ei(n) is a geometric series, and when 11 -aiql < 1, limn-+oo ei (n) = O. This has established that with properly chosen ai, the adaptation will converge to the optimum.
Following [6] , it is also straightforward to establish the global stability of the algorithm in a differential equation form (10) using an appropriate Lyapunov function.
d d t Xi(t) = ai(wi -Xi(t)P(t)).
C. Implementation considerations (10)
In a residential energy management scenario, we envisage that each user in our model is represented by an entity or software agent called home energy manager (HEM) at a consumer's home. There is a home area network (HAN) that connects all the appliances in the home, communicates with HEM via low power wireless such as ZigBee, and gathers all the necessary information for DR. HEM is further connected to the grid (supplier) via either wired or wireless links. Based on the price information it receives, HEM calculates demand in the next time slot and distributes it to different appliances. The overall architecture is shown in Figure 1 .
We note that some appliances like refrigerator and heating have hard consumption scheduling requirements, while others such as washing machine have soft requirements [5] . When HEM has to shift the demand to another time slot, it may apply only to soft appliances. For example, HEM obtains x(n + 1) based on (6) with WTP parameter w. If it can satisfy the demand from the hard appliances (denoted by h), it can re-schedule the demand from some of the soft appliances (denoted by s) so that x(n + 1) = h(n + 1) + s(n + 1).
On the other hand, if it cannot meet the demand from the hard appliances, HEM may have to increase w and recalculate x(n + 1).
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use simulations to study the behavior and dynamics of the proposed algorithm. There are N = 10 users and without loss of generality we assume that the capacity C is 100. For the price function (3), a = 1, k = 4. Here, since our purpose is to illustrate the concept and stability of the proposed framework and algorithm, the units of the simulation parameters (e.g. price, demand) are not that important and hence we omit them.
We start with a basic simulation. Here all the users initiate their demands at 2, and their willingness to pay parameters range from 11 (user 1) to 20 (user 10). All the users have the same adaptation parameter a of 0.1. Figure 2(a) shows the demand changes with time for 10 users. After a short transient period, each user demand converges to a stable value (determined by different w values). It is also evident that w is a crucial factor in determining how aggressive a user should be responding to the price signals. Figure 2(b) clearly shows that the price converges to the optimal value. When the system reaches its equilibrium (assuming a = 1), we have
( Li=l xi(n)) k
Summing over i on both sides of (11), it is easy to verify that the price at equilibrium is
In this case, In the next simulation experiment we study the effect of a on system performance. Figure 3 , it can be seen that with a larger a, it takes much longer to converge. Therefore a is an important system parameter that controls the convergence speed of the process. In Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4 (b), we study the effect of heterogeneity of initial demands, i.e., ten users start with demands ranging from 1 to 10 respectively. We observe that different initial conditions do not affect the system stability and convergence to equilibrium.
In addition to heterogeneous initial demands as in the last simulation, here users also have different adaptation rates ai: This paper is just a first step towards our vision of fully distributed demand response. There are a number of directions for future research. Firstly, we are currently implementing our model in a more realistic residential energy management scenario. More specifically, we are running simulations using real energy consumption and usage profile traces collected at homes and studying the system behavior of our algorithm.
Different utility functions are also considered. Secondly, the proposed model fits nicely into the game theory framework.
Based on our model, it would be interesting to study the system dynamics and user interaction in a large scale energy demand game context. Thirdly, one important element of intelligence in the smart grid is the learning capability of various components. In demand response, if users can learn from past observations (e.g. prices and load profiles), then they can predict the future load and price and adjust their strategies accordingly (e.g. adjusting (Xi and Wi ). In this context, Bayesian networks and reinforcement learning are some of the powerful tools we can leverage to enable learning in this highly dynamic environment.
